Media Effects

The media, indisputably, have 'effects' on audiences. Bob Geldof's 'Live Aid' (1985) raised millions of pounds for starving people in Ethiopia in a single day. The BBC's 'Crime Watch' series has been responsible for the capture of criminals as witnesses have come forward to provide evidence as a result of its crime reconstructions and appeals. Television advertising has boosted the sales of thousands of brands including some, such as the margarine Krona, from their launch to market leader in a matter of weeks. That television has 'effects' on audiences cannot, logically, be denied. Nevertheless, media analysts are far from sure as to the extent and kinds of effects the media have, or as to how these effects occur.

The control of television stations, in addition to other organs of the media such as radio stations or printing presses, has always been a priority for those seeking power, as can be seen most clearly at times of civil wars or military coups. The power of television for social control has been clearly grasped, in this sense, by those who exercise such control directly. Many of the complex issues which relate to the ideological power of television are covered in more detail in the chapter Ideology. The popular debate on the effects of television, however, from which it is often difficult to escape, are more commonly concerned with the far narrower issues of violent or sexual content and the effect of exposure to such material upon audiences, particularly younger audiences.

Historical Background to Effects Debate

Concern about the 'harmful' influence of the media can be traced back as far as the days of Shakespeare when the content of plays, and even the location of theatres, was very strictly controlled. In the nineteeth century cheap, sensationalistic fiction, referred to as 'penny dreadfuls' in Britain and 'dime novels' in America, were held responsible for a variety of social ills. Similarly, street theatres and music hall of the turn of the century were blamed for street crime and 'loose morals', while, cinema was being subject to censure and censorship from the earliest screenings (which were frequently pornographic, even by today's standards). Crime and horror comics, were the object of outrage and legislation in the 1950s as communists, labour and conservative M.P.s in Britain united to severely curtail their 'depraved' content . The same fears have been repeated in relation to paperback novels, jazz, rock and roll, rap music, video nasties, video games and, most recently the Internet.

Television has taken centre stage in this debate due to its place in the home, widespread (and frequently heavy) usage, and easy access by all age groups. The title of Marie Winn's book 'The Plug-in-Drug' (1977) sums up many of the fears expressed about the medium, particularly in relation to children: namely, that television can be 'addictive' and 'harmful' to those who watch it. The specific negative claims most commonly made against television are that, by seeking mass audiences, it has caused a decline in aesthetic tastes and standards of popular culture; that it promotes escapism, passivity and dependency; and that it encourages habits of violence and delinquency. Research goes on continuously into the last of these accusations, and it is the area most commonly debated in the mass media, including, ironically, television itself. There are, however, other issues such as the role of television in stereotyping groups, or setting the agenda for debate, that are less commonly debated, at least in the popular, public realm, but which can equally be regarded as an aspect of the 'effects' controversy.

The 'Hypodermic Effect' Model

The perceived effectiveness of the mass media in the propaganda campaigns in Europe and the Soviet Union from the First World War to the end of the Second World War, led to a widespread belief in the power of the mass media to control men and women against their will. The relative novelty of cinema, radio and early television combined with rapid urbanisation and the weakening of traditional social relationships may, at least in part, have given substance to the common assumption that audiences were relatively passive, naive and easily manipulated in the face of such media. The Frankfurt School (see chapter Ideology) share some of these assumptions about the power of the media and the compliant nature of audiences.

This view of the audience as broadly undifferentiated in their response to a media stimulus or message , a response which was assumed to be immediate, has been described as the 'hypodermic effect', or simply, 'effects model'. While this behaviourist 'myth' of media omnipotence has since been rejected by most researchers, there remains some evidence for a fairly straightforward stimulus - response model for particular audience effects that cannot be lightly dismissed. The often quoted example for this is 'The Martians Have Landed' (1938), Orson Welles' radio adaptation of 'The War of the Worlds', a science fiction novel by the nineteenth century writer H.G.Wells. What was unusual about the drama was the documentary style, which simulated news bulletins and interviews with 'real' experts such as government officials and army doctors. Because many people missed the announcement at the beginning of the programme, telling listeners that what they were about to hear was a fictional reconstruction, there was, according to several testimonies, widespread panic, 'sightings' and even reported rapes by the alien invaders :

'Long before the broadcast had ended, people all over the United States were praying, crying, fleeing frantically to escape death from Martians. Some ran to rescue loved ones. Others telephoned farewells or warnings, hurried to inform neighbours, sought information from newspapers or radio stations, summoned ambulances or police cars. At least six million people heard the broadcast. At least a million of them were frightened or disturbed.' (Cantril 1971 quoted in Braham 1987)

Other critics claim the extent of the panic had been exaggerated by the media and Orson Welles himself who, it is suggested, revelled in the publicity. Furthermore, as Burton (1990) notes, there were other crucial factors contributing to the night of panic, such as people's knowledge of the imminence of real war, which had them in a state of high anxiety anyway.

Further evidence of the 'hypodermic effect' was provided in a famous experiment by Bandura, Ross and Ross (1961) when children were allowed to observe an 'adult model' under several conditions, one of which involved the adult attacking a Bobo doll (an inflatable clown) with a hammer. Children were then taken to a room that contained toys such as a tea set, crayons, a hammer and a Bobo doll, and given the opportunity to play for a while. The results showed that children who had watched an aggressive model were more aggressive than children who had watched a non-aggressive model or those who had watched no model at all, and then been given the same play materials. Critics of these experiments have pointed out that the situation is an unrealistic and artificial one, and has no relevance in explaining real-life aggression.

(Davies and Houghton 1991)

Media power has also been held responsible for several dramatic political developments such as the civil rights campaign in the United States in the 1960s'; anti-Vietnam demonstrations in America and Europe; the spread of 'terrorist' activity (given the 'oxygen' of publicity for a range of activities, notably in a series of hijackings in the 1970s'); the fall of communist regimes in the former Eastern Bloc; and street riots in Britain in the early eighties and in Los Angeles in 1992. Clearly, the screening of a group of police viciously beating Rodney King was instrumental in provoking civil unrest in the last case. In many of these examples it is arguable whether television acted as a catalyst for the violent expression of deep rooted public resentment, rather than as a cause of the violent unrest in itself

Such claims should be balanced by an alternative view of the media as an 'undeclared arm of the establishment', particularly at times of social and political crisis. To take only one example, some critics such as John Pilger have demonstrated how television helped to sustain the war in Vietnam for many years, until the weight of public opinion, and a series of humiliating American military defeats, forced television stations to give expression to alternative viewpoints of the conflict.

Finally, it is worth briefly considering the 'hypodermic effect' at a personal level in terms of the effectiveness of advertising and other messages. Most people have experienced, at some time, the effect of watching a product such as coffee, chocolate, cigarettes or a cold drink being consumed on television, (whether it be a film, television programme or advertising break) and wanting that product immediately. In some ways, the less conscious we are of being 'manipulated' in these circumstances the more effective the message becomes. It is for this reason that particular 'subliminal' advertising techniques remain outlawed, such as inserting images of a product that are only a few frames, or less than an eighth of a second in duration. Such limitations are evidence of a general acceptance of the potential of television to elicit a desired response with, or without, the conscious knowledge of the audience.

Challenges to the 'Hypodermic Effect'

American media analysis of the 1940s and 1950s attempted to establish the measurable impact of the media of mass communication on human behaviour through laboratory experiments and social surveys. Its conclusion - that the media was, on the whole, harmless, or merely reinforced the norms and values of a pluralist society - was an almost complete reversal of previous opinion. A variety of reasons were given for this conclusion, including the preconceptions of the audience which, it was argued, acted as a powerful filter of media messages. For example, those with strong political convictions, or a religious upbringing, might react against a given media message as completely as audiences were previously assumed to have accepted them. The prevailing image in this model is of an audience composed of sociological and psychological groups who 'expose themselves to, understand and remember communications selectively, according to prior dispositions' (Curran et al quoted in Braham 1987). In this sense, the media, including television, were seen to be acting far more as an agent of reinforcement than as an agent of change.

Two Step Flow Theory

Katz and Lazarfield (1960) argued that people lived in groups, and that groups, and opinion leaders within groups were the 'determinant' of, or a crucial factor in, the formation of social attitudes. They stressed that audiences respond indirectly to information given through the media, even in news and current affairs material which presented relevant social and political information. It was argued that respected members of our peer group were more influential than the media themselves, even though the media may have influenced them in the first place. This approach was influential in much of the research of the 1960s and 1970s, particularly into the influence of television and election campaigns on political opinions.

Uses and Gratifications Model

According to this theory, which first found expression in the USA in the 1940s, audiences use the media to gratify certain needs, such as a need for entertainment, information, personal identity and social interaction. As Fiske (1987) remarks, 'Television and its programmes do not have an "effect" on people. Viewers and television interact.'

This functional approach to audience behaviour tends to reduce the manipulative, 'ideological' role of the media, and to some extent, denies or underplays the long term effect of the selective presentation of 'facts' and approved actions - or 'normative consensus' predominantly expressed in mass media texts. The 'uses and gratifications' model does, however, accord mass audiences with far greater 'reading' powers than previous models. These readings are seen to resist the power of the dominant ideology - as in feminine readings of soap operas set within, yet against patriarchy. Fiske is a keen proponent of this view:

'There is a power in resisting power, there is a power in maintaining one's social identity in opposition to that proposed by the dominant ideology, there is a power in asserting one's own subcultural values against the dominant ones. There is, in short, a power in being different.' (1987)

Current Effects Research

Media effects are researched in different ways. Advertising agencies and advertisers closely monitor the results of their television campaigns, through extensive market research. 'Independent' researchers rarely make use of this information, mainly because they do not to wish be associated with studies paid for, and conducted in the interests of commercial concerns. In any case, much of the evidence of the multi-million pound advertising industry remains confidential. Areas of 'effects' which do not benefit from expensive market research surveys include advertisers' generally accepted role in reinforcing a broad range of stereotypes, and the

extent to which advertising creates 'false needs' , encouraging an anxiety-driven consumer culture which is detrimental to society and, particularly, those on low incomes.

Media 'effects' are also researched by a number of media institutions.The BBC and ITV jointly control The Broadcasters' Audience Research Board (BARB) which provides viewing figures, and more detailed audience responses to terrestrial, satellite and video-recorded programming through electronic monitoring , interviews and questionnaires. Automatic meters are connected to 4,500 homes which continuously record which sets are on and which channels are being watched. Other research is commissioned by television stations through, for example, the BBC-run Television Opinion Panel which ask 3,000 people a week to complete a booklet rating on all the programmes they watch. Questions relating to the audience's response to, for example, violent or sexual matter may be (and often is) included in any of this research.

The Government, in addition to requiring terrestrial broadcasters to keep themselves informed on the state of public opinion about the programming and advertising they broadcast, have set up other bodies to monitor television output and register public concerns. The Independent Television Commission (ITC), which takes advice from ten regional Viewer Consultative Councils, enforces license conditions, including rules on taste and decency. However, unlike the body which it replaced - the IBA, they do not pre-vet programmes. The Broadcasting Complaints Commission (BCC) set up in 1981 deals with complaints of unfair treatment or alleged infringement of privacy by both television and radio programme makers. The Broadcasting Standards Council (BSC) was established in 1988 'to act as a focus for public concern about the portrayal of violence and sex, and about standards of taste and decency.' (HMSO 1993) The BSC monitors programmes, examines complaints from the public and undertakes research.

In addition to media and government sponsored surveys, there is a large body of research conducted by 'independent' bodies, such as sociology, psychology, media and communication, or cultural studies departments of universities. The type of research conducted includes content analysis of the media products, experimental studies in the laboratory, correlation studies and field studies of attitude and behavioural changes amongst diverse television audiences.

In an experimental study there is an organised attempt to measure the effect of a stimulus on an experimental group, which is then compared to a set of results taken from a control group - where all aspects of the experiment are replicated ( with the exception of the stimulus). An example of this type of research is the 'Bobo doll' study of Bandura, Ross and Ross (1961). The problems that are commonly recognized with this kind of study are that only immediate, short term effects can be measured, and that experimental situations are, in fact, wholly artificial, and different in a number of respects from real life situations. A field study is conducted away from the 'laboratory' in an attempt to record audience behaviour as it occurs in more domestic environments, or obtain reactions and opinions soon after the media experience. This may involve observing audiences as they view programmes or simply recording viewers responses in a questionnaire. Correlation studies attempt to show a link between two factors such as watching violence on television and behaving violently. Examples of this type of research include Belson's survey of adolescent boys in London, and Milavsky's survey of American teenagers which came to diametrically opposed conclusions about the effects of exposure to TV violence (Braham 1987). Even in those studies where there appears to be a link between watching violent material and violent behaviour, it is difficult to establish if violent people choose to watch more violence on television than others, or whether they are made more violent by their viewing habits.

Television and Violence

More than 1,000 pieces of research, covering psychology, psychiatry and sociology, have been commissioned into the area of media effects, making it one of the most studied questions in mass communication. But, there appears to be no firm conclusion about whether violence on screen breeds real-life violence or crime.

Measured on the basis of violent acts per hour, and contrary to popular belief, Britain has less than half as much violence on television today as it did in the 1940s or 1960s. In fact, there has been a steady decline in the 'amount of violence', as measured in this way, since the second world war. The country with the highest number of violent acts in prime-time dramatic fiction is Germany (8.6 per hour) with more than three times as much violence as the UK (2.5). Curiously, Japan, with 7 violent acts per hour compared to 5.5 for the United States, is regarded as one of the safest countries in the world. (Cumberbatch 1989)

In fact, research indicates that there is far less violence on British screens than elsewhere in the west. Guy Cumberbatch, of Aston University, who has undertaken one of the most detailed reviews of research available, has found that British viewers are subjected to about half the volume of violence shown in the United States, Canada, Australia and much of Europe. 'In that context, the concerns about on-screen violence here seem a bit misplaced.' he claims.

Nevertheless, such attempts to measure levels of 'sex' and 'violence' on television are virtually meaningless without some knowledge of the type of act recorded, or the context in which it takes place. In this sense these figures, and any correlation studies that might relate to them, suffer from the shortcoming of all content analysis. A simple 'body count', or 'violent act' tally, for instance, would make 'Dr Strangelove' (in which the world is destroyed) or 'Independence Day' (in which whole cities are wiped out) amongst the most 'violent' films of all time, despite their innocuous reputation. In a film, video or television programme, a rape or torture scene may either be presented, for example, as an appalling act, or as glamorised fun. In Britain, but not in all countries, the latter presentation is subject to censorship by the guidelines of broadcasters or the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) due to the fear that sexual violence or sadism presented as entertainment influences a significant minority of men. These examples usefully illustrate the proposition that there is no such thing as 'sex and violence' on the screen, but that there are only 'ways of showing sexual or violent encounters'.

Context, again, is a crucial determinant of the reaction to violent material. As the television journalist and arts presenter Melvyn Bragg makes clear:

'There are certain areas - for instance, documentaries and arts programmes - where violence of action and language has been admitted for some time, on the understanding that these are specialised areas which have earned special treatment. So the Arena on Edward Said recently showed the most contemptuous cold-blooded killing of Algerians by French soldiers; the South Bank showed what Berlioz, as a young medical student, experienced so traumatically gazing at the abattoirs in Paris. The c-word was used on arts programmes more than 12 years ago with no fuss. In that sense, distinctions between programmes are well made.

News also receives, and deserves, special treatment. Care is taken with early bulletins, and warnings are given in late bulletins, but it is a matter that merits constant debate. Given the horrors in the former Yugoslavia, ought we to be protected from the worst that is happening to the distraught Muslims ? The violent effect on our consciences of the starving in Africa testifies to television's duty and power to portray unwelcome and all but unacceptable "truths". These lead to a serious and continuing discourse about the portrayal of the world through film reports on the news. And we are right to have those debates.'

One theory that is frequently referred to in public debates about screen violence is the 'desensitising effect' of such material. This relates even to images of wars or disasters in the news, as mentioned above. News organisations talk about 'war weariness' or 'compassion overload' in relation to charity appeals. It is also suggested that exposure to fictional violence hardens us to the image of real violence. A special effects aided close up of a violent death may well have greater emotional impact than a shaky, grainy image of someone falling in battle, who has been actually killed in front of the cameras. However, the desensitisation or 'innoculation' theory remains largely an anecdotal or common sense assumption and Burton (1990) reminds us that research has found no evidence to support this theory.

In fact, studies conducted into the effects of watching violence in fictional material have, on the whole, come up with contradictory, and incomplete evidence. There seems to be an acknowledgement that particular disturbed individuals, some one or two per thousand, clearly imitate violence on television. There is also some evidence that a much larger number of people become more fearful, developing a heightened and perhaps unjustified sense of danger in the outside world. However, even this tentative suggestion has been countered by the possibility that heavy viewers may bring with them a more simplistic or a more alarmist view of the world in which they live, rather than adopting such perspectives from watching television. The problems with so many correlation studies as Braham (1987) points out, is that 'they produce correlations, the development, connections and direction of which are insufficiently elaborated.'

Children and Television Violence

The young have always been felt to be particularly vulnerable to the effects of 'harmful' material, and the history of concern in this area stretches back to the ancient Greeks who debated whether particular stories or dramas corrupted the youth, or provided purgation and 'catharsis'. Early studies of media effects concentrated on young people and the cinema in the USA in the late 1920s. The most famous, established by the Payne Funde in 1928, examined the relationship between film watching and juvenile crime. Although no causal links were established, such studies did little to dispel popular fears that the media could, and did, deprave young audiences. Therefore, when teenagers appeared to ape the surly, rebellious manner of Marlon Brando in 'The Wild One' (1954), or 'rioted' in the cinemas when Bill Haley's 'Rock Around the Clock' was played over the opening titles of 'The Blackboard Jungle' (1955), these were thought to provide clear proof of how mass media content might make audiences more delinquent or violent.

This charge has been supported by a number of social scientists. According to a study by Wilson the media can act as a destabilising influence on those with an 'anti-social disposition'. The mass media, he claimed, provided these audiences with vivid fantasies, stimulate criminal, violent, sensational and salacious appetites and, in so doing, present a set of values which 'stand in stark contrast to the values entrenched in our existing social institutions - the family, the work place, the school, the law courts, the church - and in our social relationships.' (Wilson quoted in Braham 1987)

Some studies have indicated that the level of aggressive behaviour could be predicted in young adults by using a knowledge of the kinds of television programmes they viewed as children (Eron et al. 1972). Belson's survey of teenage boys in London found that participation in acts of serious violence had been, apparently, increased by heavy exposure to violence on TV. However, this survey was subsequently criticised for methodological flaws. Boasting plays a part in many of the responses of young people to research questions, and in several studies where made up titles for films had been given, the participants claimed they had seen them.

It is also difficult to separate the effects of other variables such as a child's disposition and the environment in which they were raised. Not only can it be shown that children who watch more violence on television are more aggressive, but it is also the case that children with aggressive dispositions are more likely to watch violent television programmes (Eron, 1987), and furthermore that 'aggression-prone' children are likely to become even more aggressive when watching programmes with a violent content (Stein and Friedrich, 1975).

The possible link between violent video films and the horrific killing of James Bulger by two ten year old boys brought a fierce debate over these issues into the public domain. Passing sentence on the two children Mr Justice Morland drew attention to a possible connection between the crime and films in the family house. It was, by this time, common knowledge that 'Child's Play 3', an 18 certificate film , was hired by Jon Venables's father, less than a month before James's abduction and murder. The film features a doll called 'Chucky' which is possessed by an evil killer and dressed in toddler's clothing. The judge said that while it was not for him to pass judgement on their upbringing, he suspected "exposure to violent video films may, in part, be an explanation."

However, according to newspaper reports of the time, detectives involved in the case rejected suggestions that the two boys transferred the role of Chucky to their victim. There is no proof that either Venables or his codefendent, Robert Thompson, saw the film. Mr Venables said the film was hired for himself and that his son only watched cartoons. Detective Superintendant Albert Kirby, who led the inquiry, said that he had seen no evidence to suggest the boys had access to videos any worse than might be found in many households. Asked whether violent films may have influenced the boys' actions, he said: "The area of videos was one we looked at and we cannot find any specific thing which highlights that."

Following the Bulger case, Professor Elizabeth Newson, head of the child development unit of Nottingham University produced a report called Video Violence suggesting that researchers had 'underestimated' the harmful efects of violent videos. The report, which received wide publicity, particularly as it had been endorsed by twenty-five psychologists, paediatricians, educationalists and other scademics turned out to be only nine pages in length, contained no original research and concluded, as most surveys do, that more research was needed. In much the same way, Guy Cumberbatch reviewed the existing literature on media effects and concluded that there was nothing that had been proved empirically. Although 77 % of the research seemed to support a causal link between media violence and crime in most respect the research, in his view, had been quite inadequate and did not concur as some reviewers suggested. Cumberbatch cited one study of 1,500 boys aged 13 to 16 which concluded that boys with high levels of exposure to television violence commit 49 per cent more acts of serious violence. In fact, on closer inspection, the study showed that those with the highest exposure to violent television were found to be the least violent of all the children.

There appears, therefore, to be highly debatable evidence for the potentially harmful effects of programmes on children. Some representations of violence, Branston (1996) suggests may even have a positive effect in creating revulsion at certain kinds of assault, or military power, or bullying. Meanwhile, other studies have been conducted into the wider positive effects of television. Some researchers have suggested that pro-social behaviour, such as helping and sharing, can be learnt from various sources, including television. Stein and Friedrich (1975), for example, observed increases in pro-social types of play in young children who watched programmes in which behaviours such as sharing were emphasised. (Davies and Houghton 1991) Presumably, these studies would be open to the same kinds of questions and complications as research into negative effects.

It may seem reasonable to conclude, then, as Braham (1987) does, that there has been little advance beyond the findings of studies as far back as 1948, that 'some kinds of communication, on some kinds of issues, brought to the attention of some kinds of people, under some kinds of conditions, have some kinds of effects'. This may be due, however, as Lewis (1990) remarks to the limits of the investigative methods of effects researchers than with television's lack of power and influence.

Cultural Effects Theories

Cultural effects describe the ways that collective audiences, rather than individual members of an audience, are influenced by the media. In this respect researchers are interested in the defining role of the media on society and culture. Such effects may include stereotyping, moral panics, agenda setting, socialisation, and, encompassing all of these, the endorsement and reproduction of ideology. There is a fundamental disagreement amongst theorists and researchers as to whether the media, in this respect, act as agencies of social control, imposing dominant class values on subordinate groups ( a Marxist perspective), or whether they merely act to reinforce consensual norms and values (a liberal 'pluralist' perspective).

Stereotyping

While there is much discussion about the possible effects of the media, and even of the very existence of 'effects', at the very least it is generally agreed amongst researchers that the media tend to present a stereotyped view of people and society. This artificial way of presenting types of people whether in, for example, soap operas or in comedy, can affect the way people view different social groups, or themselves (see chapter Representation and Stereotyping). Evidence of effects might include the massive growth of Klu Klux Klan membership following D.W. Griffiths 'The Birth of a Nation' (1915), which celebrated the Klan's activities against crudely stereotyped black people (usually played by white actors in black face paint) who were shown to be corrupt, ignorant and evil.

While racist activity in the United States increased dramatically following release of 'Birth of a Nation' in most cases the effects of stereotyping are regarded as gradual and long term rather than immediate. Gillian Dyer writes of advertising in the following terms:

'It is more likely that an advertisement's effects are diffuse and long term, and there is some evidence that advertsising plays a part in defining 'reality' in a general or anthropological sense... for instance, the sex-role stereotyping common to many advertisements - the 'little woman' as household functionary thrilling to her new polished table or whiter-than-white sheets, or the masterful, adventurous male - act, many social scientists argue, as agents of socialisation and lead many people, young and old, to believe in traditional and discriminatory sex roles.'

Moral Panics

Jazz, rock and roll, punk rock, feminism, black muggers in the 1970s, welfare scroungers, video nasties, drugs, joyriders, single parent mothers, falling educational standards and new age travellers are all examples of issues which have been the focus of 'moral panics' in the media. It is the disproportion between what takes place and the reaction to it that endows the response with the character of a panic. Hence, while much research shows that general educational standards have risen substantially since the Second World War, the media have been instrumental in perpetuating the myth of falling standards - a useful device for attacking the principle of free, universally available and well-funded comprehensive education. Similarly the financial cost of welfare fraud is completely dwarfed by the scale of insurance and investment fraud that characterised so much of the 1990s, the cost of which is rarely debated in the media.

Moral panics have tended to occur at times when society has not been able to adapt to dramatic changes, such as during the upheavals of the Industrial Revolution or the modernising trends of the 1960s'. When the old system of values has difficulty explaining new developments, society and individuals within it can experience a sense of loss of control and in these circumstances single issues can quickly become the focus of fear and 'panic'. Moral panics are usually led by the popular press, but are then picked up by the broadcast media as an 'issue of public concern'.

Political Influence of Television

'No Prime Minister can afford to quarrel with the Media because it is difficult to win.' (Margaret Thatcher)

The fact that, for twenty years, the BBC banned 'The War Game', a dramatisation of the effects of a nuclear attack on Britain, and during the same period banned, delayed or doctored more than fifty programmes critical of government policy in Ireland is testimony to a belief in the potential of television for changing people's political opinions.

Politicians are clearly concerned about the political effect of media coverage of their activities. Advertising takes up more than 80% of the campaign expenditure of the major political parties, compared to less than 3% for public meetings. Harold Wilson, a Labour Prime Minister in the 1960s and 1970s, threatened unspecified action against the BBC for alleged anti-Labour bias. Before the 1987 election Norman Tebbit, then the Conservative Party chairman, prepared a dossier seeking to prove anti-Government and anti-American bias in the BBC's coverage of the United States bombing of Libya the previous year. Alasdair Milne, the BBC's director-general, issued a vigorous rebuttal - but a few weeks later he was fired.

Research into the political effects of television has reflected general trends in effects research. Early research conceived of the political influence of television in dramatic terms: capable of 'brain-washing' people to conform to any given message without much questioning about why they do so. George Orwell's novel '1984' reflects some of these assumptions of how television could be used for 'thought control' and was based on Orwell's views of actual totalitarian regimes such as the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership.

A reaction to this monolithic view of the media and audience reaction, particularly in the area of political influence - such as voting in general elections, took place in the 1950s. Trenaman and McQuail's survey of the 1959 General Election seemed to show that the media affected neither the floating voter nor more stable electors. Floating voters were found to be shielded by their own indifference to, and avoidance of, politics from any media message, while loyal voters tended to reinforce their prejudices through what was called 'selective exposure' to political messages.

The 1980s and 1990s have seen the erosion of traditional voting patterns, with working class loyalty to the Labour Party a major casualty and a new breed of floating voter emerging, less indifferent to parliamentary politics than simply volatile, or unpredictable, in voting behaviour. Under these circumstances the media have been seen by several observers to have a far more crucial role to play in successive election campaigns. Television's 'impartial' role in this process has come into question by a number of critics. In the run up to the 1992 election and with a new director-general, John Birt, making changes to news and current affairs coverage, the BBC was warned by Kenneth Baker, the Home Secretary, in an interview with 'The Observer' that they had 'to be very careful over the next eight to ten weeks...The country expects the BBC to be absolutely impartial as it is a state-funded body.' They had to be careful, as Granville Williams suggests, not to upset the Conservative Party because the organisation was facing an uncertain outcome over negotiations regarding its new charter. ITN was also facing a difficult period as the ITV networks as a whole were facing the rundown of the old ITV franchise system.

Against this background, Williams argues, in 1992 as in 1987, broadcasters appeared to have their agenda set for them by the predominantly Conservative supporting press. He also examines coverage of the economy and the way in which the reporting of financial and city news worked to the disadvantage of Labour in those elections:

'By the end of the 1980s financial and city news had become central areas of media reporting, especially on television. This was one consequence of Conservative promotion of the merits of share ownership, entrepreneurs and business dealing in general. Consequently movements in the City were routinely reported and 'experts' from merchant banks and finance houses were consulted for their apparently neutral opinions on the latest trade or financial news. This gave them an important status as 'impartial commentators'. 'Good news' for them, which they projected through the TV medium, was a healthy stock market and rising shares.

In electoral reporting, the prefences of the City were made absolutely clear by referring to such share movement. On ITN, when Labour took the lead in opinion polls the City sounded close to collapse:

Newscaster: Billions of pounds were wiped off the value of shares this morning, as the city, which traditionally prefers Conservative governments, took fright at the clear Labour lead in opinion polls.

Industrial Correspondent: It was headlines like these (refers to headline in The Times) showing Labour pulling into the lead which helped to turn the City dealing room screens red. At the start of trading billions of pounds were wiped off shares.' (ITN 12.30. 1.4.92)

The BBC told a similar story, reporting that 'In the city worries about a Labour victory pushed share values down sharply..' (BBC, 18.00, 1.4.92)

If the City and the business class are seen as crucial movers in economic health, then such coverage must help the Conservatives. This is especially so if there is no counter-ideology providing constant reminders of the damage which the Conservatives and the City have actually done to the economy. In this sense virtually all the media could be seen as operating against the interests of Labour.'

Of course if, as seems to be the case in recent years, Labour policies appear to move closer to the interests of 'the City', this apparent party bias in television news coverage may well disappear.

Twenty million people watch the news on television every day. For the whole population, news and current affairs are increasingly responsible for providing our picture of social reality, and it is a picture which many accept as impartial and authoritative. The importance of broadcast media in providing checks and balances against excesses of the state and other powerful interest groups, or of simply providing reliable information for the citizens of a country, is widely recognized. It is television, and not the press, which is relied upon by the majority of people for an 'impartial' perspective. In 1992 an opinion poll commissioned by 'The Independent' showed that two-thirds trusted both BBC and ITN to tell the truth, compared to only 29% who believed the newspapers. Williams (1994) quotes from a MORI poll to illustrate this point:

'In 'We British: Britain Under the MORIscope', Bob Worcester and Eric Jacobs asked people what influenced their thinking on a range of key issues and concluded: "On the vast majority of twenty four issues, television was chosen by the greatest number of people as having the greatest influence.'

Set against this view is the fact that in 1987 Labour was supposed to have had a great TV campaign co-ordinated by Peter Mandelson who was the Labour party director of communications, and Labour was widely believed to have won the campaign due to the coverage. The Conservative Party thought they had performed so badly on TV that the central office held an inquiry into the TV campaign, resulting in a highly critical report. However, despite that, the result of the election was that Labour was heavily defeated.

'Cultural Norms'

'The eddies and currents of dissent in popular consciousness find virtually no representation in media interpretations of the world.' (Westergaard (1977)

From the 1960s onwards there was a return to the concept of a powerful and influential media and a shift in focus away from short term influences, towards the longer term effects of the media in constructing consensus, proscribing limits and setting the agenda for political debate. The idea that the media influence our views of social reality by selective presentation and emphasis of information is referred to as the 'cultural norms theory'.

Closely associated with the cultural norms theory, is the process of 'agenda setting' whereby the boundaries, or terms of reference, of a debate are fixed to suit the interests of the dominant power groups in society. Other perspectives may be briefly voiced, but they are usually presented as peripheral, or marginal, to an assumed 'consensus', and are frequently reported negatively. This type of reporting is referred to as 'innoculation' by Barthes, as it allows a small dose of a 'disease' that threatens the existing order to be 'inserted in such a way as to ensure that the social body is strengthened and not threatened by the contrast between it and the radical.' (Fiske 1987)

Hence, road protestors, for example, are rarely given the chance to articulate their point of view fully against the policies of the government. Instead their cause is usually only given television coverage when they are in direct conflict with the police, bailiffs or road constructors. Similarly, the subject of 'animal rights' is only briefly discussed when activists commit a crime or 'outrage' public opinion by threatening animal researcher's directly. While road building and animal experimentation ( like nuclear power and other 'environmental concerns' ) face considerable public opposition, discussion of such topics between activists and senior politicians in the 'respectable' space of a television studio hardly ever takes place. Some critics suggest this type of non-coverage by the media causes these groups to resort to more direct types of conflict to draw any kind of recognition for their cause. In this sense, the media can, ultimately, be seen as providing the 'oxygen of publicity' for terrorism.

The critical approach to media effects suggested by cultural norms and agenda setting regards television as providing an illusory or, at least, highly compromised, platform for genuine democratic debate, . The 'dominant discourses' (see chapter Ideology), in fact, carefully limit and qualify what can, and what can not, be discussed in the public forum of television, and the mass media in general. Thus, as Fiske concludes:

'Television does not "cause" identifiable effects in individuals; it does, however, work ideologically to promote and prefer certain meanings of the world, to circulate some meanings rather than others, and to serve some social interests better than others. This ideological work may be more or less effective, according to many social factors, but it is always there, and we need to think of it in terms of its effectivity in society at large, not its effects upon specific individuals or groups. "Effectivity" is a socio-ideological term, "effect" an individual-behaviourist one.' (Fiske 1987)

Essay

'This is the age of the moral panic.' Consider in detail a recent moral panic.

Essay

David Alton and 100 M.Ps signed a motion condemning the granting of a certificate for the video release of Oliver Stone's 'Natural Born Killers' in the United Kingdom. Alton suggested the film was an advertisement for shooting, burning and killing. What evidence could be produced to support or reject this motion ?

(or)

'Through self-censorship and well-established practices (Britain's terrestrial channels) are in fact the most regulated television networks in the free world. Coincidentally, they are also the most popular. In ITV, for instance, besides the laws of the land, we have the Independent Television Commission patrolling sex, violence, "language" and impartiality; the Broadcasting Standards Council as a public appeal court; the Broadcasting Complaints Commission; lawyers inside each of the 15 companies bound to detailed guidelines on the taste and decency of every single programme; and widely observed rules such as the 9pm watershed, which is seen by many parents as a sacred trust.' (Melvyn Bragg - TV arts presenter)

Is there any justification for such strict controls of television output ?

(or)

The technology exists to fit a V-chip - or violence chip - into new television sets to censor brutality, bad language and sex scenes. The chip is operated by remote control whereby parents can set the permissable levels of language, sex and violence on a scale of one to five. Introduction of the technology has been opposed by various groups, including the traditionally conservative National Viewers and Listener's Association. What reasons might the NVLA have for opposing the censorship device ? What justifications could manufacturers or legislators present for the introduction of this technology ?

Sources

Bandura, A. Ross, D and Ross, S (1961) 'Transmission of Aggression through Imitative Learning, Journal of Abnormal' and Social Psychology quoted in Davies, R. and Houghton, P. (1991) 'Mastering Psychology' MacMillan

Blumer, J. (1970) 'The political Effects of Television' in Halloran, J (ed) 'The Effects of Television' Panther

Cumberbatch (1989) 'The Portrayal of Violence in BBC Television' BBC Publications

Dyer, G (1982) 'Advertising as Communication' Methuen quoted by Lewis, J in Goodwin et al (eds) (1990) 'Understanding Television' Routledge

Fiske, J (1987) 'Television Culture' Routledge

Furedi, F. 'A Plague of Moral Panics' Living Marxism November 1995

Barker, M. 'Sex Violence and Videotape' Sight and Sound 1992 ?

Katz, E and Lazarfield, P.F. (1960) 'Personal Influence' Free Press

Leapman, M. 'The Heavy Breathers' The Independent on Sunday March 1 1992

Lewis, J in Goodwin et al (eds) (1990) 'Understanding Television' Routledge

Davies, R. and Houghton, P. (1991) 'Mastering Psychology' MacMillan

(Eron et al. 1972, 1987) quoted in Davies, R. and Houghton, P. (1991) 'Mastering Psychology' MacMillan

(Stein and Friedrich, 1975) quoted in Davies, R. and Houghton, P. (1991) 'Mastering Psychology' MacMillan

Westergaard, J. 'Power, Class and the Media', in Curran, J et al (Eds) (1977) 'Mass Communication and Society' Arnold

Williams, G (1994) 'Britain's Media - How they are Related' Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom

Readings - Media Effects: The Popular Debate

In the absence of any concrete evidence either for or against particular 'effects' by social scientists and media experts the debate returns time and time again to the public domain. The following represent a selection of personal views by journalists and politicians on the popular debate surrounding media effects:

Extract from 'Sense and Censorship' by Richard Boston in The Guardian (1993)

'(Professor Elizabeth) Newson is concerned about films that show "violence as 'all good fun' something with which to while away one's leisure time." OK, out goes custard-pie comedy. Very much out goes Tom and Jerry. I've never seen a really nasty video nasty, but I can't believe they're nastier than Titus Andronicus. If you're going to ban anything, how about the paintings of Grunewald ? Indeed the museums and churches and cathedrals of Europe are full of images of tortured people, flayed, grilled, racked, disembowelled, that are of a horror that would be unimaginable if the Christians hadn't thought them up.

Professor Newson asks what is the "different" factor that has entered the lives of countless children and adolescents in recent years ? Her answer is "This has to be recognised as the easy availability to children of gross images of violence on video." What kind of evidence from an expert is "It has to be....?" Why shouldn't the "different" factor be Velcro, or the Rubik cube, or Mrs Thatcher, or cling film, or Roland Rat ?

My own view is that nasties (video or otherwise) are the product of violence rather than its cause. To argue otherwise, as do people like David Alton and Mrs Whitehouse, is like suggesting that the wind is caused by trees shaking their branches. Did King Herod need to watch video nasties before he slew the little children ? Think of Hitler. If Hitler had watched videos there really would have been no more Mr Nice Guy. And Stalin, Napoleon and all the others. And the acid-bath murderer Haigh, who was only obeying the orders which he read in the Holy Bible.

Anyone who seriously wants to find the causes of violence in society should look first at militarism and religion, which for centuries have fostered it and perpetuated it. I'm not suggesting that anyone should be complacent about violent videos, but compared with the suffering caused by heartless churches and governments, their significance barely registers.'

type up Blair's piece etc

The following are a selection of letters from the public relating to media effects, reflecting arguments for and against the assumption that 'popular culture is debasing society by inspiring crime and violence'. The letters appeared in The Sunday Times as part of a promotional campaign for 'Hollywood v America' by the conservative commentator Michael Medved, a book serialised by the Sunday Times and published in full by Harper/Collins - part of Rupert Murdoch's News International Corporation.

'Fatal Flaw'

'Michael Medved asserts that violence on the screen increases violence in society. He then goes on to criticise the film producers who say they simply reflect modern society in their depiction of on-screen brutality. 'Throughout the 1980s," he writes, "FBI statistics showed slight but consistent drops in the national rate of violent crime, but in the same period the television crime rate increased sharply." Has it escaped Medved's attention that in proving his second argument against the film makers, he has also provided rather damning evidence against his main argument.

Unfortunately I do not rejoice in finding his logic flawed: I hate violent films and applaud Mr Medved's attack on the industry, until, that is, I discovered that neither of us had cause to be concerned.'

Neal Foster

Coleshill, Birmingham

'Special Effect'

'Film makers have always been acutely aware of their power to influence and shape public opinion and attitudes. Take, for example, the British films made during the second world war designed to booste morale, or the post-revolutionary films of Russia which portrayed the virtues of communism. Nobody seriously doubted the ability of these films to mould society's thinking. It is surely inconceivable, therefore, that a stream of excessive violence in current films will fail to affect at least a proportion of those who see it.

If anyone still doubts this, then they should simply look at the advertising industry. This clearly believed that adverts on television and at the cinema can influence the minds of viewers, and spends a vast fortune each year in support of this theory.'

Anthony Roberts

Shoreham-by-Sea West Sussex

'Mirror Mirror'

'Popular Culture merely reflects what's going on in society and so it is ludicrous and simple- minded to blame it for society's ills. Sex and violence were around a long time before movies came along. We are living in a world where news of every murder, disaster and atrocity is brought to us instantly by television. It would be more damaging if popular culture did not reflect this (Nazi Germany's popular culture did not reflect what was going on in its society - deliberately). You couldn't make Mr Smith Goes to Washington today, even if you wanted to. The world is no longer that naive - thank goodness.'

M.A. Lowry

Littlehampton, West Sussex

'Bad Example'

'I would like to add another strand to Medved's argument, namely that there is a tendency in the media, and in television in particular, to "normalise" deviant, anti-social or simply criminal behaviour. This drip-drip-drip forms a backcloth to the excesses Medved describes.

A decade ago we had the brilliantly written and superbly played Porridge. It conveyed messages trivialising the the wrong done by cons and belittling the screws. The self-seeking deviousness of fletch was depicted as 'fun'. More recently we have had Bread, the everyday story of scrounging folk. Their circumstances, attitudes and income are taken for granted, sanitised and made acceptable. Finally, a few days ago I sat down to enjoy Last of the Summer Wine with my 10-year-old son. This programme has given us many wholesome laughs over the years. I was placed in some difficulty, therefore, when the roguish-but-OK-really figure of Compo stole a piece of fruit from a corner shop.'

David Hull

Halifax, W Yorks

(source: The Sunday Times Culture Supplement 14th March 1993)